11 组元化学反应气体粘性激波层钝体绕流数值计算

本文采用１１组元化学模型对双曲体粘性激波层化学非平衡绕流流场进行了数值计算,给出了压力、温度,Ｎ＋２、Ｏ＋２、Ｎ＋、Ｏ＋和ＮＯ＋摩尔浓度及ｅ－数密度在驻点的分布,并与７组元、５组元的计算结果作了比较。     

舰载机轮胎子午化可行性研究

文章以制约我国舰载机发展的关键技术航空轮胎为着眼点,通过研究国内外舰载机轮胎发展现状,对舰载机轮胎子午化的可行性进行了分析,提出了舰载机轮胎子午化势在必行的论断,为新研制的各型舰载机项目提供有力支持。     

吸气式高超声速飞行器助推分离过程数值仿真

针对吸气式高超声速冲压发动机验证性试验特殊的飞行环境和助推分离条件，以某轴对称吸气式高超声速飞行器级间分离问题为具体研究对象，采用非结构网格局部网格重构技术和非定常问题非定常六自由度问题仿真方法，对该复杂构型飞行器助推分离过程进行数值计算。研究得到弱干扰冷态分离状态下飞行器及助推器的运动参数和气动力参数在分离过程中的发展规律。对0.3 s内助推器的位移轨迹进行分析，判断分离方案的可行性，并给出最佳的分离工况条件。     

基于系统构型替换的固冲发动机故障模式半实物仿真

为全面快速验证冲压发动机的故障检测算法，基于构型替换建立了能模拟多种固冲发动机故障的仿真验证平台。基于此平台，搭建了发动机点火故障模型、压强传感器故障模型、设备接口模型，以及与真实控制器中检测算法具有相同外部接口和系统构型的故障检测算法模型等。通过系统构型的切换，将同一个故障模式注入故障检测算法模型和真实发动机系统，并通过对比同一组故障模式下故障检测模型检测结果与发动机控制系统检测结果，来对发动机控制器中的故障检测算法进行快速验证。以无喷管助推器点火的检测为例，讲述了该方法的建模、实验验证及分析过程，此外，该方法还能应用到无喷管助推器关机、进气道前后堵盖打开、燃气发生器点火、燃气流量容错控制等多个故障模式的仿真模拟与验证，具有很强的通用性，能大大地降低控制系统开发与验证的时间成本，具有很强的应用价值。     

军用飞机改进改型研制费用的参数估算法

首先分析并建立了军用飞机改进改型研制的费用分解结构,阐明了与新研飞机在各分项费用上的差别。基于当量工程的概念提出了用减缩系数来估算改进改型研制的费用修正和各分项费用的减缩系数的估计方法,结合现有成熟的参数估算模型建立了相应的改进改型研制的费用估算模型。最后,以某型飞机的改型研制费用为例进行了实例分析,结果表明方法与模型具有较好的有效性和实用性。     

目次

为改善等离子体合成射流激励器在稀薄空气环境中的控制效果,增强其临近空间环境适应性,开展了腔体增压条件下激励器工作特性的研究。建立了腔体增压效果理论分析模型,计算结果表明:采用高压气源供气可以较好地提升激励器腔体气压,并且腔体气压对高压气源气压具有较好的跟随性,从而为射流强度调节提供了一种新的方式。搭建了腔体增压等离子体合成射流激励器实验系统,开展了腔体增压压力和射流流场特性测量,实验测量结果与计算结果吻合良好,误差小于2.6%。高速纹影观测显示:在腔体增压作用下,激励器控制力得到显著改善,射流锋面峰值速度由256 m/s提升至507 m/s。     

反辐射导弹攻击航母毁伤效能分析

针对某型航母建立了基于海平面的舰桥主桅坐标系,近似计算了一处雷达天线密集区各设备在该坐标系中的坐标,建立了某三维相扫描三坐标雷达、某目标捕获雷达、某对海雷达等典型雷达天线的数学模型,根据反辐射导弹战斗部的引爆点位置及破片模型解算了反辐射导弹对密集区典型目标的毁伤效能,以期对反辐射导弹攻击航母提供理论支持.     

滑移边界条件的收敛性分析及应用

用速度滑移与温度跳跃边界条件代替通常假定的无滑移边界条件,可有效地提高计算流体力学模型对高空滑移流区域流动的预测精度。应用Maxwell滑移边界条件时,通过直接计算速度梯度及温度梯度而得到速度滑移和温度跳跃量的处理方法在网格较密的时候会出现迭代计算发散的问题。理论分析表明,直接计算梯度的方法使边界条件的时间推进过程等价于雅克比迭代过程,因此必须满足相应的收敛性条件。为了消除收敛性条件的限制,给出了一种在任意网格密度下均收敛的边界条件处理方法并通过数值算例验证了该方法的正确性。针对高空高超声速流动,以空天飞机为例,对比了滑移/无滑移边界条件所得结果的差异,分析了滑移效应对飞行器气动特性及热环境的影响。     

To Be or Not To Be: The Development of Soviet Deck Aviation

Few issues were as contentious in the development of the Soviet Navy as the role of aircraft carriers and sea-based aviation. Despite the continued insistence by the highest naval authorities and scientific experts that surface combatants simply could not be protected in the open ocean without the support of ship-borne aviation, Soviet leaders – for a variety of reasons – resisted aircraft carrier development until the final decades of the Cold War. In examining one of the most defining and telling asymmetries of the Cold War at sea, the author argues that while the USSR was economically and technologically capable of building aircraft carriers of any class, bureaucratic infighting, misperceptions of cost and practicality, and the inherent flaws of a totalitarian system ultimately created an impossible gap in capabilities between the two sides. The priorities and direction of Soviet weapons and defense technology development during the Cold War was largely a factor of the military-political situation taking shape at home, and in the world. As a rule, the navy was assigned missions that corresponded to its capabilities at a given point in time, rather than the other way around. Often, the navy lacked the material resources needed to implement its core mission. The availability of these resources, in turn, depended on the country's economic situation, its scientific potential, the technological state of its industry, as well as the subjective influence of political and military leaders on the priorities of technological development. The impact of the country's socioeconomic imperatives was undoubtedly also felt in the sluggish pace of development of ship-borne aviation and aircraft carriers in the USSR.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.